Wisconsin has a law that lets a parent buy their underage child a beer. It is written into the statute in plain language, and it is the reason the Papa Stache case is harder than it looks.
On July 17, 2026, 18-year-old Joshua Schladweiler crashed a motorcycle in Muskego at what witnesses described as roughly 100 mph, crossed the center line near Woods Road and Parkland Drive, and hit a van. He died at the scene. His blood alcohol concentration was later measured at 0.171.
Before the crash, according to Big Bend police, he had spent the evening at Papa Stache Pub and Eatery in Big Bend, drinking beer. The bartender serving him was his mother, Angela Schladweiler.
Police have referred four charges against her, FOX6 reported November 6: second-degree reckless homicide, sale of alcohol to an underage person, criminal recklessness, and sale to an intoxicated person. The Waukesha County District Attorney’s Office has not filed any of them. The village has scheduled a due process hearing on Papa Stache’s liquor license for November 30 at 6 p.m.
Most coverage has stopped at the part that makes the story land: a mother poured her son’s beer and then he died. The legal machinery underneath is more interesting, and it runs in a direction most readers will not expect. Wisconsin’s statutes may make the headline charge the weakest one in the referral, and may make it structurally difficult for the village to take the bar’s license over this night at all.
Quick Answer
Last updated: November 2026
Wisconsin law permits a parent to furnish alcohol to their own underage child, and permits the child to consume it on licensed premises, as long as the parent is accompanying them. Under Wis. Stat. § 125.07(1)(a)1., an accompanied underage person is exempt from the prohibition on furnishing, and under § 125.07(4)(a)2. an accompanied underage person is exempt from the prohibition on possessing or consuming alcohol on licensed premises. Chapter 125 never defines “accompanied,” but the Court of Appeals has construed it to require supervision or control, not mere co-location. Separately, § 125.12(1)(b)2. bars a municipality from considering a violation of § 125.07(1)(a) unless the licensee committed another violation within the year before it — which means one catastrophic night, standing alone, generally cannot cost a Wisconsin bar its license.
What the statute actually says
The provision is not a loophole buried in an annotation. It is the operative text of the underage drinking statute.
Under § 125.07(1)(a)1., no person may “procure for, sell, dispense or give away any alcohol beverages to any underage person not accompanied by his or her parent, guardian or spouse who has attained the legal drinking age.”
The same carve-out reaches licensees and permittees under § 125.07(1)(a)2.: no licensee may sell to an underage person “not accompanied by his or her parent, guardian or spouse who has attained the legal drinking age.”
Section 125.07(3)(a) bars an unaccompanied underage person from being on licensed premises, subject to seventeen enumerated exceptions in subds. 1. to 17.
And Section 125.07(4)(a)2. makes it a violation for an underage person to possess or consume alcohol on licensed premises “unless accompanied by a parent, guardian or spouse who has attained the legal drinking age.”
Read those four together and the structure is clear. Wisconsin did not accidentally omit parents from its underage drinking law. It wrote parents in, in four separate places, and made the parent’s presence the dividing line between lawful and unlawful.
That is what defense attorney Jonathan LaVoy told FOX6: Wisconsin “allows parents to either provide alcohol to their child or allow others to provide alcohol to their child as long as they are accompanying their child during the consumption.” He is describing the statute correctly.
The word the statute never defines, and the case that did
Here is where the case turns, and where the coverage has been thinnest.
Chapter 125 defines dozens of terms in § 125.02 — “alcohol beverages,” “underage person,” “legal drinking age,” “licensee,” “permittee,” “retailer,” “sell.” I read the definition section. “Accompanied” is not among them. The word appears nowhere in § 125.02.
But undefined is not the same as uninterpreted, and this is the part of the story that has not been reported anywhere. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has already decided what “accompanied” means under this exact subsection, and it rejected the reading LaVoy offered on television.
“Underage drinkers are not accompanied by a parent for the purposes of sub. (1) (a) merely because the parent and child are on the same premises. Parents who held a party and told their son not to drink where he could be observed by the other guests and who did not know how much their son drank were neither supervising nor otherwise controlling their son when he was drinking and were thus not accompanying him.” — Mueller v. McMillian Warner Insurance Co., 2005 WI App 210, 287 Wis. 2d 154, 704 N.W.2d 613
That is the opposite of what a “same room” gloss would give you. Under Mueller, accompaniment is not a question of physical proximity. It is a question of supervision and control. Being in the building is not enough. Being at the bar while your son drinks at the rail is not enough. The court asked whether the parents knew how much their son had drunk, and answered that they did not — and that failure of knowledge was itself the reason they were not accompanying him.
Apply that to a bartender. A parent who is also on shift, pulling taps, running the service well, greeting the Friday crowd, is present in the building and may be supervising nobody. If Mueller controls, the fact that Angela Schladweiler was working behind the bar the night her son drank there is not a defense. It may be the state’s best fact.
And the legislature wrote the fact question into the statute explicitly. Section 125.07(6), headed DEFENSES, directs that “in determining whether or not a licensee or permittee has violated subs. (1) (a) and (3) (a), all relevant circumstances surrounding the presence of the underage person or the procuring, selling, dispensing or giving away of alcohol beverages may be considered.” Not a bright line. A totality test, which is exactly the kind of standard that gets decided on surveillance video.
So the live questions are concrete: Was she in the room for each beer? Did she leave the bar area, go to the kitchen, the office, the back? Did she know how much he had drunk? Did she supervise the consumption, or only hand over the bottles? Big Bend police say the video shows her serving him multiple times. The video answers who poured. It does not answer whether she was supervising, which is the element Mueller says the statute actually names.
That reframes LaVoy’s prediction. He told FOX6 he doubts charges will file, and he may be right, but if he is, it will not be because the law lets a parent buy the beer. It will be because proving supervision and control beyond a reasonable doubt, against a parent who was working a shift, is hard. Those are different claims, and only one of them is good news for the defense.
The charge the parental exception cannot reach
If the accompaniment defense holds, it defeats one of the four referred charges outright: sale to an underage person, which is defined by the carve-out itself. It does not touch the other two felonies, because second-degree reckless homicide and recklessly endangering safety turn on the defendant’s mental state rather than on the age of the drinker. A lawful pour can still be a reckless one.
That leaves the fourth charge, which is the one worth watching, and which the carve-out never reaches at all.
Section 125.07(2)(a)1. reads: “No person may procure for, sell, dispense or give away alcohol beverages to a person who is intoxicated.”
There is no age element in that sentence. There is no parental carve-out. It does not matter whether the person being served is 18 or 48, or who they came in with. It asks one question: was the person intoxicated when the alcohol was handed over?
At a BAC of 0.171, the state has a strong fact for that element. Wisconsin’s prohibited alcohol concentration for ordinary adult drivers is 0.08 under § 340.01(46m), and 0.171 is roughly 2.1 times that. For a driver under 21, § 346.63(2m) prohibits operating with an alcohol concentration of more than 0.0, absolute sobriety, no impairment showing required, in the band up to 0.08. At 0.171 Schladweiler was above that band, so the operative provision would be § 346.63(1)(b), the prohibited alcohol concentration offense, not (2m).
The penalty is modest. Section 125.07(2)(b) sets a fine of $100 to $500, up to 60 days in jail, or both. Compared with a Class D felony, it is a parking ticket.
But modesty is not the point. It is the charge that survives the argument that defeats the others, and, as the next section explains, it may be the charge that gets around the licensing statute’s one-year gate.
Why Papa Stache probably cannot lose its license over this night alone
This is the part of Wisconsin licensing law that almost nobody outside the trade knows, and it is the single most consequential provision in this story.
Section 125.12 governs revocation and suspension. Subsection (2)(ag) lets any resident of the municipality file a sworn written complaint with the clerk, alleging a violation of the chapter or of municipal regulations, among other grounds. A complaint was made here; that is what triggered the village’s review.
Then comes the gate. Section 125.12(1)(b)2. is the gate:
“No violation may be considered under this section or s. 125.04 (5) (a) 1. unless the licensee or permittee has committed another violation within one year preceding the violation.”
Read it twice, because it does not mean what people assume it means. It is not a statute of limitations. It is a prior offense requirement, and it runs the wrong way for anyone who wants a license pulled over a single event. To consider violation B, the licensee must have committed violation A within the year before B.
Subsection (1)(b)1. defines “violation” for that paragraph as a violation of § 125.07(1)(a) — the underage furnishing and sale provisions — or a local ordinance that strictly conforms to it. The same subsection adds that where a licensee has committed two or more violations within a year, “all violations committed within one year of a previous violation may be considered,” which widens the window rather than closing it.
Apply it. The July 17 incident is the violation the village wants to consider. Under § 125.12(1)(b)2., it cannot be considered unless Papa Stache committed another § 125.07(1)(a) violation between roughly July 2025 and July 2026.
That is why the sentence in the FOX6 story that reads like background is actually the whole case: police say Angela Schladweiler was previously cited for providing alcohol to underage patrons at Papa Stache, and that she served her son on “several previous occasions.”
Whether the November 30 hearing can reach the July 17 conduct depends on three things nobody has published: the date of that prior citation, whether it falls inside the one-year window, and, critically, whether it was issued against her as an employee or against the licensee.
That last distinction is not hair-splitting. The statute keys the trigger to “the licensee or permittee.” A citation against a bartender is not obviously a violation committed by the licensee, though a licensee can be exposed for permitting the conduct. An unexamined assumption either way decides the hearing before a witness is sworn.
The escape hatch in the gate
There is a reading of the statute that may let the village past the one-year rule, and it depends on the same fourth charge.
Section 125.12(1)(b)1. defines “violation” narrowly, and only for that paragraph: a violation of § 125.07(1)(a), or a conforming local ordinance. Section 125.07(2), sale to an intoxicated person, is a different provision of the same chapter. It is not within the defined term.
Subsection (2)(ag)1. separately allows a complaint alleging that the license holder “has violated this chapter”, the whole chapter, not just § 125.07(1)(a).
So there is a genuine argument that a § 125.07(2) violation can be considered as a ground for suspension or revocation without satisfying the prior-violation gate that governs § 125.07(1)(a) violations. The defined term does the work: the gate in (b)2. is written against “violation,” and “violation” in (b)1. means § 125.07(1)(a).
I am flagging this as an argument, not a settled answer. No appellate decision I could locate construes the interaction between (1)(b)1., (1)(b)2. and the broader complaint ground in (2)(ag)1. If a reader knows of one, it would change this analysis. But if the argument holds, the practical consequence is striking: the charge with the smallest penalty is the one with the clearest path to the bar’s license.
What a license hearing actually is
It is not a criminal trial, and it is not a formality.
Section 125.12(2)(b)2. provides that if the licensee appears and denies the complaint, both sides may produce witnesses, cross-examine them, and be represented by counsel. The licensee is entitled to a written transcript at their own expense.
If the complaint is found true, the outcome is binary and severe. The municipal governing body “shall either” suspend the license for not less than 10 days nor more than 90 days, “or” revoke it. There is no fine option at that stage. A suspension of a tavern license is a shutdown; a revocation is worse.
Under Section 125.12(2)(c), a revoked license is recorded by the clerk and no other license under the chapter may be granted to that person for 12 months. No part of the fee is refunded.
And under Section 125.12(2)(d), the governing body’s decision is reviewable by the circuit court for the county, not only by the licensee, but by “any applicant, licensee or resident of the municipality.” A resident who wanted the license pulled can, in principle, take a decision they consider too lenient to court. That is an unusual grant of standing.
Note the shape of the proceeding: the village is not prosecuting a crime. It is deciding whether a business keeps a privilege. It is contested rather than criminal in form: the village is not proving a crime, and the proceeding is administrative in character rather than an evidence-code trial. But the stakes for the business are higher than the misdemeanor fine in § 125.07(2) by orders of magnitude.
The civil side, where the immunity most people assume does not apply
Ask a Wisconsin bar owner about dram shop liability and you will hear that the state is immune happy, that patrons are responsible for themselves, that the bar is protected. That is roughly true for adult patrons. It is not true here.
Section 125.035(2) grants a broad civil immunity: “A person is immune from civil liability arising out of the act of procuring alcohol beverages for or selling, dispensing or giving away alcohol beverages to another person.”
Then subsection (4)(b) removes it: immunity does not apply if the provider “knew or should have known that the underage person was under the legal drinking age and if the alcohol beverages provided to the underage person were a substantial factor in causing injury to a 3rd party.”
Both of those elements are easy to allege. A mother knows her own son’s age. And a van driver who was struck by a motorcycle is about as clean a third party as the statute contemplates.
But there is a condition in front of that exception, and it cuts against everything above. Section 125.035(4)(a) defines who counts as a “provider” for the subsection: a person who furnishes alcohol “to an underage person in violation of s. 125.07 (1) (a).” If the accompaniment carve-out means the furnishing was lawful, there is no provider, the exception in (4)(b) never opens, and the blanket immunity in (2) stands.
Which means the civil exposure and the criminal exposure are not two questions. They are one question asked twice. The reason a charge may not file is the same reason a lawsuit may not lie. A bar owner who reads the accompaniment analysis as good news should read it again: on these facts it is the tavern’s civil shield, not the mother’s criminal defense, that the carve-out actually protects.
The van driver’s strongest argument runs the other way. If the state proves the pour was a violation, because accompaniment fails under Mueller, or because the sale was to an intoxicated person under § 125.07(2), then both the criminal and the civil doors open at once. The two analyses move together in both directions.
The safe harbor that ordinarily protects a licensee, that the underage person falsely represented their age, is unavailable on its face. The statute requires four things: a false representation of age, supporting documentation, good-faith reliance on that representation, and an appearance such that “an ordinary and prudent person would believe” the person had reached the legal drinking age. A mother serving her own son cannot satisfy the first or the last of those.
Wisconsin courts have applied this exception repeatedly. In Miller v. Thomack, 204 Wis. 2d 242 (Ct. App. 1996), the court held that a provider is not immune when the alcohol was a substantial factor in injuring a third party, and that the third party’s own underage drinking does not change the analysis. In Meier v. Champ’s Sport Bar & Grill, Inc., 2001 WI 20, the supreme court set the outer limit: an underage drinker who is himself injured by the alcohol he was served is not a “third party” and cannot use the exception to sue other providers. Stephenson v. Universal Metrics, Inc., 2002 WI 30, is the counterweight: a designated driver who agreed to drive, freeing a bartender to keep serving, “procured” the alcohol under the statute but was himself immune when the passenger later drove and killed someone. That case is about a provider’s shield, not a bystander’s access to the exception, and it marks the edge of the doctrine rather than an application of it.
The pattern in the case law is consistent: the exception protects injured bystanders, not the drinker. Raymond Amdahl, the van driver, is a bystander.
The felony is real, and it is the hardest charge to prove
Second-degree reckless homicide is not a minor add-on. Section 940.06(1) reads: “Whoever recklessly causes the death of another human being is guilty of a Class D felony.” Under § 939.50(3)(d), a Class D felony carries a fine up to $100,000, imprisonment up to 25 years, or both.
But “recklessly” is doing a lot of work, and the legislature defined it in a way that makes this charge difficult against a parent who handed over beer.
Section 939.24(1) defines “criminal recklessness” as conduct that the actor “creates an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm to another human being and the actor is aware of that risk.”
Two elements, and the second is subjective. The state must prove she was actually aware of an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm. Not that a reasonable person would have been. Not that serving an 18-year-old and letting him ride is negligent. She perceived the risk and acted anyway.
That is a demanding standard for a mother serving her adult-sized son in a bar, and it is why a homicide charge filed against a bartender-parent would be unusual. Wisconsin case law treats this as a genuinely subjective test, the statute’s annotations describe it as requiring both an objectively unreasonable risk and the actor’s subjective awareness of it.
Proving it might be possible. A BAC of 0.171, a motorcycle, and a parent who watched him leave would be the state’s theory. But it is a materially harder case than the headline “mother served son, son died” suggests, and the referral is a police recommendation, not a charging decision.
The fourth charge is misnamed
“Criminal recklessness” appears in the police referral as if it were an offense. In Wisconsin it is not. It is the mental state defined in § 939.24, and it is an element of other crimes rather than a crime in itself.
The offense the referral probably means is recklessly endangering safety, Section 941.30. First degree, recklessly endangering safety under circumstances showing utter disregard for human life, is a Class F felony: up to $25,000 and 12 years 6 months. Second degree is a Class G felony: up to $25,000 and 10 years.
That distinction matters for how the referral should be read. Police referrals routinely use shorthand. What gets filed, if anything, will be a specific statutory offense with specific elements, and the label in a press account is not the charge.
Who was allowed to pour
One more provision deserves attention, because it governs the bar’s exposure separately from the mother’s.
Section 125.32(2) requires that licensed premises be staffed by the licensee, the agent named in the license, or a person holding an operator’s license responsible for the acts of everyone serving. It then provides that “any member of the licensee’s or permittee’s immediate family who has attained the age of 18 shall be considered the holder of an operator’s license” for purposes of that subsection.
Separately, Section 125.17 governs operator’s licenses, and § 125.04(5)(a)1. makes an arrest or conviction record a qualification issue for licenses under the chapter, subject to § 125.12(1)(b).
FOX6 reports that the village review covers the operator licenses of several staff members, not only the bar’s retail license. That is a second front. Under § 125.17(2), an operator’s license is personal to the holder and valid only in the issuing municipality. Losing one means not tending bar in that village.
What happens on November 30
The village clerk has scheduled a due process hearing for 6 p.m. Big Bend police turned additional materials over to the district attorney that week, and a DA spokesperson said officials are reviewing them to determine whether charges will be filed. Police are still asking anyone who was in the bar that night to come forward.
Three things to watch, in order of legal consequence:
First, the date of the prior citation. If it falls within the year before July 17, 2026, the § 125.12(1)(b)2. gate opens and the July night can be considered. If it does not, the village’s path to the license runs through the § 125.07(2) argument described above, or it does not run at all.
Second, who the prior citation was issued to. The gate is written against “the licensee or permittee.” A citation to an employee is not the same thing, and that question may decide the hearing more than any testimony about the crash.
Third, whether the DA files. A charging decision changes the posture of everything. A criminal conviction under § 125.07(1)(a) would be a violation for licensing purposes; a pending charge is not a conviction, and the presumption of innocence applies to Angela Schladweiler as it would to anyone.
The uncomfortable part for anyone who runs a bar
Wisconsin’s parental exception is not a drafting accident, and it is not a defense anyone in this trade should want repealed. The usual reading is that a family which may legally drink together at home should not commit a crime by doing so at the tavern, and that the legislature chose the parent over the bartender as the responsible party in that transaction. That is an interpretation of purpose, supported by the structure of the chapter rather than by any stated legislative finding.
What the Papa Stache case exposes is how thin the supervision assumption is in practice. The statute’s protection depends on a parent actually accompanying the consumption, and “accompanying” is a word the legislature never defined. A parent who is also on shift, working a service well, greeting the Friday crowd, is in the building and may not be accompanying anybody.
For a tavern, the operational lesson is not “never serve a parent’s kid.” It is that the exception is a defense you have to be able to prove, and the evidence for it is a video you did not know you would need. The elements are presence during consumption, continuous supervision, and a record that shows both. If your camera covers the bar top but not the room, you have the first fact and not the second.
And the § 125.12 gate cuts the other way too. A bar that has never had a § 125.07(1)(a) violation in the preceding year has meaningful structural protection against a license action over a single night, protection that disappears the moment a prior citation lands. The prior citation is the asset that matters, and it is the one most operators never think about until the hearing is on the calendar.
What this article does not claim
No criminal charges have been filed against Angela Schladweiler. She is presumed innocent. Police referred charges; a referral is a recommendation to prosecutors, not a finding.
The THC vape referenced in Raymond Amdahl’s statement is an allegation in a victim’s written statement, not an investigative finding. If substantiated, a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in a driver’s blood is independently prohibited under § 346.63(1)(am) without any showing of impairment, and § 346.63(2m) makes any alcohol above 0.0 an offense for a driver under 21, up to 0.08, above which § 346.63(1)(b) applies. Both are allegations at this stage.
The reading of § 125.12(1)(b)1. and 2. above, that the one-year gate is written against § 125.07(1)(a) violations specifically, and may not reach a § 125.07(2) violation alleged under § 125.12(2)(ag)1. is an analysis of the text, not a holding. I found no appellate decision construing the interaction.
Sources
Statutory text read directly from the Wisconsin Legislature’s official site (docs.legis.wisconsin.gov), 2023-24 Wisconsin Statutes updated through 2025 Wisconsin Act 247 and published November 4, 2026: §§ 125.02, 125.04(5), 125.07, 125.12, 125.17, 125.32(2), 125.035, 340.01(46m), 346.63, 939.24, 939.50, 940.06, 941.30.
Case law from the annotations to § 125.07 and § 125.035: Mueller v. McMillian Warner Insurance Co., 2005 WI App 210, 287 Wis. 2d 154, 704 N.W.2d 613, aff’d on other grounds, 2006 WI 54, 290 Wis. 2d 571, 714 N.W.2d 183; Miller v. Thomack, 204 Wis. 2d 242, 555 N.W.2d 130 (Ct. App. 1996); Anderson v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 2003 WI 148, 267 Wis. 2d 121, 671 N.W.2d 651; Meier v. Champ’s Sport Bar & Grill, Inc., 2001 WI 20, 241 Wis. 2d 605, 623 N.W.2d 94; Stephenson v. Universal Metrics, Inc., 2002 WI 30, 251 Wis. 2d 171, 641 N.W.2d 158; Doering v. WEA Insurance Group, 193 Wis. 2d 118, 532 N.W.2d 432 (1995); Greene v. Farnsworth, 188 Wis. 2d 365, 525 N.W.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1994).
News reporting: FOX6 News Milwaukee, Bret Lemoine, “Wisconsin bartender served underage son before fatal crash: police,” November 6, 2026. Aggregated coverage from WXLV, WKRC, WPEC, WCTI, WHP, WGXA, WCYB, KFXL and WKEF reviewed; none analyzed § 125.12(1)(b)2.
Court records: Wisconsin Circuit Court Access, searched November 10, 2026. No criminal case against Angela Schladweiler appears statewide; the two entries naming Papa Stache Pub & Eatery LLC are a 2026 Department of Workforce Development filing and a 2022 small-claims action. A municipal ordinance citation would not necessarily appear in that system.
Population: 2020 U.S. Census, via published municipal summaries, Big Bend 1,483; Muskego 25,032; Waukesha County 406,978. Geography confirmed against OpenStreetMap place and road data.